New Tang Dynasty TV: Renowned British Sinologist talks about Article 23

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On 17th December 2002, New Tang Dynasty TV interviewed Professor Michael Yahuda, a renowned China expert in the London School of Economics and Political Science, on the proposed legislation on Article 23 in Hong Kong. Professor Yahuda is one of the 44 scholars who wrote to the Chinese government in opposition to this legislation.

Below is the whole text of the interview.

Q. Professor Yahuda, what’s the background of this Article 23 legislation?

A. Well, it goes back to the negotiations between Britain and China, especially in the development of the Basic Law after the Tiananmen events. Beijing said it was not satisfied with the provisions about security that existed in the legislation that the British had had in Hong Kong. The British and the Chinese were unable to reach an agreement about this. So then it was agreed that Hong Kong would enact legislation about treason, sedition, security and so on. Once Hong Kong had become part of China again, because it was so contentious, the Tung Cheehwa administration did not bring this in in their first term of office. But then the Chinese government wanted it brought in in their second term. That is why it has been brought in at this time.

Q. Do you they are targeting any specific groups?

A. I don’t think it’s targeted at specific groups. I think the initiative of this really comes from the mainland. Their concern used to be about the idea that Hong Kong could be a base for groups operating there that would have an influence on China that Beijing did not like. They were, for example, very upset about the fact that there were organisations in Hong Kong that supported the students during the Tiananmen demonstrations. So I think they wanted the legislation to stop that. In addition to that, Beijing had been very concerned that Hong Kong might be a base from which foreign governments and different organisations could carry out espionage and other activities in China. And the results have been that they used a very broad, brush approach that in the end endangers the existing laws about freedom of information, freedom of association in Hong Kong.

Q. I noticed that you signed a petition addressed to the President of China against the Article 23 legislation. Why are you opposed to this legislation?

A. Because I think it will damage Hong Kong. Because it will restrict, first of all, the free flow of information. It will also make people feel very concerned about what they can say, what they can write, and with whom they can associate. And therefore it will intensify the issue of self-censorship within Hong Kong. It will also increase the influence of the mainland-style of politics within Hong Kong, and will gradually erode the Hong Kong system. And it will in the end diminish the value of the whole concept of “one country, two systems”. Not only will this be damaging to the people of Hong Kong and the standing of Hong Kong economically in the world, but I think it will also be damaging to China itself.

Q. What do you think will be the negative effects on China?

A. Because China will be shown to be unable to honour its promise of maintaining a separate system within Hong Kong allowing it a high degree of autonomy, the result will be that, in the end, international companies will feel there are better places for them to establish their regional headquarters rather than Hong Kong. So, if Hong Kong were to become just another kind of Chinese city, then although in the short term that may be seen as advantageous to Beijing, I think really this will be damaging both to Beijing’s credibility and to its economy.

Q. Why is the academic community so worried about this legislation?

A. Because academic communities depend on the free flow of ideas, free flow of information. And the proposed legislation, although we have not seen the details of it and we’ve only seen the consultative document, casts certain issues in such a broad, non-specific sort of way that it could define many things as state secrets, it allows police or other security organisations unfettered access to any organisations or any person that they deem has broken or suspected of having access to information that the state authorities feel they shouldn’t have. Secondly, it seeks to use the mainland as a sole source for defining who is or is not subversive. Mainland authorities do so really for political convenience. They talk about rule of law, but in fact in the mainland you have rule by law. That is to say the leaders use the law for their own political purposes. They do not feel that they, themselves are limited by law. And so, as a result, the law in China is not as respected as the law in Hong Kong. Finally, Hong Kong has a system of law which is very different form the mainland. It’s based on the common law, as opposed to the continental system from which the mainland has borrowed. And no account seems to be given to the way in which the two legal systems differ. So that is why you have the main professional bodies concerned with the law in Hong Kong who are objecting to this. That is why you find bankers in Hong Kong, international bankers as well, objecting to this. That is why you also have academics objecting to it, you also have the organisation of journalists objecting to it. The response by those who support this proposed legislation is to call all these people “unpatriotic”, and to argue this is an issue of patriotism. And this is not. So that is a further disturbing element.

Q. From the perspective of international relations, what effect would the proposed legislation have for the international relations in that region?

A. First of all, we haven’t seen the legislation. We haven’t seen the draft bill. All we’ve seen is what they call a consultative document, which is vague in many respects. The authorities say that they will consult. They will take into account what has been said. So it may very well be that, when the legislation is duly presented, it may not be as bad as some people fear that has come about through the consultative document that has been issued. But if the worst fear should be realised, what it would mean is that the last place where the press in free, the last place where there is true academic freedom, the last place where information can circulate freely in Asia will have gone. That will be obviously to the detriment of Hong Kong, but it will also be to the detriment of the region as a whole.

Q. What will be the prospects of the cross-strait relationship?

A. What it would mean is that people in Taiwan will feel that they were right to reject the idea of “one country, two systems”, because Beijing is not really willing to respect it.

Q. Are you satisfied with the response from the British government and other Western governments regarding this issue so far?

A. Well it is very interesting that the Consul General in Hong Kong raised specific objections that were supported by the government here in doing so. And the American government has also raised its concerns. They haven’t raised severe objections, because at the present stage, all they had is the consultative document. So nothing has yet happened. But nevertheless the fact that these two major governments with special interests in Hong Kong have publicly shown their concern, I think, is indicative in itself of the fact that Hong Kong has nothing to gain and a great deal to lose by going down this path.

Q. What do you think of the response from Hong Kong people and the rest of the Chinese people around the world?

A. The Chinese people around the world are not greatly concerned with this. But as to people in Hong Kong, as I mentioned before, there have been objections from professional groups, lawyers and others; there have been demonstrations, and the number of people who came out on the demonstrations surprised even the organisers. So people in Hong Kong obviously feel very concerned about this. There is a view that some of our people of Hong Kong only care about material matters, only care about the economy, and only care about how much money they have. But I think this shows that they care more than that. I think it also reflects a deeper concern about the general direction in which the Tung Cheehwa administration has been carrying Hong Kong. I think, as the opinion polls have been showing, that the popularity of Tung Cheehwa and his administration has suffered. When it first came in back in 1997, it had very high ratings. But they gradually lost them. And now it has all timed out.

Q. Do you think the people of Hong Kong and other people who are worried about this situation will be able to prevent the Hong Kong government from legislating on Article 23? What else do you think could be done to do that?

A. I think, as things stand, there is a majority in the legislature that will support the Chief Executive more or less in anything he wants to do, because half or more than half of the legislators are from functional constituencies, and reflect what is sometimes called pro-China points of view. I think that, if they were to carry on in this way, I think it would deepen the problems of Hong Kong. Hong Kong really needs a government that will be able to energise its people, set out for them some sort of vision for the future in which they can recognise that they will have a high degree of autonomy and that they can be masters of their own fate. This requires not continual erosion of such democracy that exists there, but rather the enlargement of the scope of the democracy. So far the Tung Cheehwa administration has narrowed such limited democracy that exist there, and they have based their rule on a rather small elite. They will need to widen the social base on which the government of Hong Kong rests.

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